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The  combination  of credit  constraints  and  indivisible  consumption  goods  may  induce  some
risk-averse  individuals  to gamble  to have a  chance  of crossing  a purchasing  threshold.  This
idea has  been  demonstrated  theoretically,  but not  explored  empirically.  We  test  this  idea
by  focusing  on  a key  implication:  income  effects  for individuals  who  choose  to  gamble  are
likely to be larger  than  for the  general  population.  Using  UK  data  on  gambling  wins,  other
windfalls  and  durable  goods  purchases,  we  show  that winners  display  higher  income  effects
than non-winners  but  only  amongst  those  likely  to be credit-constrained.  This  is  consistent
with  credit-constrained,  risk-averse  agents  gambling  to  convexify  their  budget  set.
© 2016  The  Author(s).  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the
CC BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Why  do risk-averse consumers sometimes gamble? One idea, ﬁrst proposed by Ng (1965), is that discreteness in spending
or in labor supply opportunities can induce local non-concavities in the value functions of risk-averse agents. This generates
local risk-loving behavior and makes it rational to gamble in order to have a chance of crossing the threshold required
to ﬁnance a lumpy purchase. A similar idea was  advocated by Chetty and Szeidel (2007) in the context of committed
consumption: when individuals are close to the region of needing to change their commitments, it may  be optimal to
gamble in order to cross the threshold of making the change. Bailey and Olson Wonnacott (1980) argued that access to
credit markets made such gambling irrational, but Hartley and Farrell (2002) showed theoretically that rational gambling
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ight still occur where borrowing and lending rates differ, where capital market imperfections exist, or if individuals’ time
reference rates differ from interest rates.1
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to use a model to develop the idea that households might gamble to cross purchase
hresholds. Our analysis shows that this mechanism implies that lottery players will have systematically different income
ffects from nonplayers. The second contribution is to provide empirical evidence that some individuals do appear to play the
ottery as a strategy for purchasing discrete goods. We  do not suggest that ﬁnancing discrete purchases provides the only – or
ven the main – motivation for gambling,2 but we show that it may  be important for credit-constrained households.3 In par-
icular, it may  help to explain infrequent lottery purchases, which amount to nearly 40% of the total (Gambling Commission,
014).
There are several reasons why it is important to know whether, in practice, consumers gamble to convexify choice sets.
irst, there is broad interest in whether credit constraints and indivisibilities in consumption pose particular challenges for
oorer households. If so, it is important to understand what strategies poor households use to overcome those challenges.
or example, Mullainathan and Shaﬁr (2009) discuss the role of lotteries in allowing poorer households to achieve “small to
ig transformations”.4
Second non-convexities due to the discreteness of choices pose a major technical challenge to researchers trying to model
hose choices structurally with dynamic programming models. One way  to overcome this problem has been to assume that
ndividuals facing such non-convexities play wealth lotteries (Hansen, 1985; Rogerson, 1988; Lentz and Tranaes, 2005). It is
nteresting to know whether this is simply a technical convenience, or if it in fact captures the way that individuals behave
hen faced with non-convexities.
Third, following Imbens et al. (2001), lotteries have been used to identify income effects across a wide range of spheres,
ncluding consumption and labor supply.5 As with all instrumental variable estimates that identify treatment effects among
 sub-group, the external validity of these results is a crucial issue and many papers acknowledge that their estimated income
ffects are valid only for a subset of the population. However, if consumers gamble to convexify choice sets, then current
amblers are an endogenously selected group: consumers will be more likely to purchase lottery tickets when they have
 desire to “convexify” and so these households will respond more strongly to income shocks than a random household
eceiving the same shock. A particular concern for external validity is that the selection process is directly related to the out-
ome of interest (probability of a durable purchase or a discrete change in labor supply). This is analogous to randomization
ias in randomized trials (Heckman and Smith, 1995) if patients decide whether to subject themselves to randomization on
he basis of their need the treatment, or the anticipated beneﬁt of treatment in their particular circumstances.
To highlight the mechanisms at work and to motivate our empirical strategy, we  ﬁrst develop a simple model where
onsumers choose whether or not to play a lottery, and then after the outcome of the lottery is known, whether or not to
uy an indivisible good. The only consumers who  play the lottery are those who  are close to the threshold of being able
o buy the indivisible good. A lottery win then enables the purchase of the indivisible good. The strength of the incentive
or gambling will be diminished if agents can borrow at reasonable rates, so that the path of non-durable consumption can
e unaffected by the timing of indivisible purchases. The need to gamble to convexify is also diminished if there are many
ndivisible goods so that the indivisibility is less “lumpy”, or if there are uninsurable income shocks which provide some
onvexiﬁcation. All this means that the importance of gambling to convexify is an empirical question.
To look for evidence that consumers gamble to convexify we use data from the British Household Panel Survey and
ocus on purchases of consumer durables. Our empirical strategy is effectively a “difference-in-differences” design with
ousehold ﬁxed effects, contrasting estimated within-household income effects for lottery windfalls with income effects for
ther windfalls (speciﬁcally inheritances) among households that are credit-constrained and households that are not. We
se unconstrained households to control for more general differences in responses by windfall type − including the degree
o which alternative windfalls are anticipated, or psychological feelings attached to different sources of windfall. We  also
se data on ﬁnancial expectations to examine directly whether inheritances are more anticipated than lottery wins. There
s no evidence in these data that this is the case.
Our main result is that, among constrained households, purchases of consumer durable goods are much more responsive
o a lottery win than to receipt of other windfall income: among the constrained, the income effect of a lottery win is ﬁve
imes greater than the income effect of a non-lottery windfall of the same size. By contrast, there is no difference in the
stimated income effects of different windfalls for unconstrained households. We  also show that there is no differential
1 One natural question is why households do not use the stock market to increase their risk and to gamble because the expected return on the stock
arket  is clearly high. The point is that the stock market does not offer a discrete jump in payoffs. We do not think it is worth pursuing the question of
hy  low income households do not use the derivative markets to take risks.
2 For example, Tufano (2008) and Kearney et al. (2011) have emphasized the entertainment aspect of prize-linked savings products in explaining their
otential attraction.
3 In the UK, this includes not only the National Lottery but also premium bonds, a government bond which have a lottery element.
4 Related to this is the case of rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) discussed by Besley et al. (1993). These are a micro-ﬁnance initiative in
hich  groups of individuals make regular contributions to a fund, the total amount of which is allocated to one member each cycle via a lottery. Handa
nd  Kirton (1999) provide evidence from Jamaica that people use their allocation from the ROSCA to buy durable goods.
5 Other papers using lotteries to estimate income and wealth effects include: Lindal (2005), Gardner and Oswald (2007), Apouey and Clark (2015),
ankins and Hoestra (2011), Kuhn et al. (2011) and Cesarini et al. (2013).
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effect of different types of windfall for spending on (a limited set of) non-durable items among constrained households. As
a further test, we examine the effects of non-lottery windfalls on individuals who  can be inferred to have played the lottery
but not had large winnings (“players”). For the subset of these individuals who are constrained, purchases of consumer
durable goods are more responsive to non-lottery windfall income than purchases by non-players. Our “small winnings
test” implies that it is not the source of the money (lottery versus other windfall) that matters, but rather that lottery players
are in different economic circumstances than non-players.
These ﬁndings highlight the importance of characterizing consumption opportunity sets in understanding consumer
choices under uncertainty. They suggest that introducing wealth lotteries in structural models of discrete choice is not just
a technical ﬁx, but captures a genuine aspect of consumer behavior. And these results question the external validity of
lotteries as an instrument for estimating income effects. We  consider this as a speciﬁc example of the more general case for
using insights from economic theory to shed light on the nature of external validity concerns associated with instrumental
variable estimates.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop the theoretical framework that guides our
analysis. In Section 3 we examine the implications of the model for the resulting income effects if lotteries are endogenously
chosen. Section 4 describes our data and empirical framework. Section 5 presents our main results, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Model of gambling to ﬁnance indivisible purchases
Our model is a one period model with two stages.6 At the start of the period (in the ﬁrst stage), agents have cash on hand
x1. They ﬁrst make a decision about whether or not to buy at most one lottery ticket: l ∈
{
0, 1
}
, where the price of the
lottery ticket is 1. They then discover whether or not they have won. The lottery ticket is actuarially fair7: an agent holding
a ticket wins 1/q with probability q, so that net winnings are (1 − q)/q with probability q and −1 with probability 1 − q. Net
winnings augment an agent’s cash-on-hand. Thus, x2 = x1if a ticket is not purchased, but if a ticket is purchased, disposable
cash-on-hand will be x2 = x1 + (1 − q)/q with probability q and x2 = x1 − 1 with probability 1 − q.
After lottery winnings are revealed, individuals decide, in the second stage, how to allocate their spending between a
divisible consumption good and an indivisible consumption good. Agents can buy at most one unit of the indivisible good
(d ∈ 0, 1) at price p. In our empirical work, the indivisible goods will be consumer durables. Without borrowing or saving,
consumption of the divisible good is just x2 − dp.  Individuals maximize utility, which depends on the consumption of divisible
and indivisible goods: v(x2 − dp, d) = u(x2 − dp)  + d;   is a preference parameter. We  assume that u′ (·) > 0, u′′ (·) < 0 and
u(0) +  < u(p), where this last condition speciﬁes that the individual will not buy the indivisible good if this implies 0
consumption of the divisible good.8
We  solve this simple model by backward induction. Deﬁne Vd=12 (x2) = u(x2 − p) +  and Vd=02 (x2) = u(x2). The indivisible
good is purchased if and only if Vd=12 (x2) ≥ Vd=02 (x2), i.e. u(x2 − p) +  ≥ u(x2).
Result 1 (single-crossing): There is a unique x∗2 such that the indivisible good is purchased if and only if x2 ≥ x∗2. x∗2 is
implicitly deﬁned by u(x∗2 − p) +  = u(x∗2).
Proof. Uniqueness follows from the fact that
∂Vd=02 (x2)
∂x2
= u′(x2) <
∂Vd=12 (x2)
∂x2
= u′(x2 − p)∀x2 (1)
which in turns follows from the concavity of u (·).
This difference in the derivative of the conditional value functions implies that the unconditional value function is non-
concave because the derivative changes discretely at the point where the two  value functions cross. This is illustrated in
Fig. 1. The degree of non-concavity will depend on the price of the durable good, p, and on the utility value of the durable
good, .
6 This means we  can abstract from borrowing and saving. As discussed later, the ability to borrow and save is likely to reduce the need to gamble to
convexify. We exploit this difference in our estimation procedure, but we  abstract from this in our model to make the motive for gambling to convexify
transparent.
7 We could introduce a penalty for gambling and make the gamble actuarially unfair, but this would simply act to offset the motive to gamble caused by
the  non-convexity.
8 The additive separability assumed here is not necessary. It is however necessary to restrict the degree of substitutability between durable and
non-durable consumption. We assume expected utility, although an extension to a non-expected utility framework may broaden the regions where
nonconvexities occur.
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Fig. 1. Durable Purchase Decision.
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Turning to the ﬁrst stage, in which the decision to gamble is taken, let Vl=11 (x1) be the value of purchasing the lottery
icket and Vl=01 (x1) the value of not gambling. A lottery ticket is purchased if and only if E
[
Vl=11 (x1)
]
− Vl=01 (x1) ≥ 0. Note
hat:
Vl=01 (x1) = max[u(x1 − p) + ), u(x1, 0)]
=
{
u(x1 − p) +  if x1 ≥ x∗2
u(x1) if x1 < x∗2
(2)
and
E
[
V1
l=1(x1)
]
= q max
[
u
(
x1 − p + (1 − q)/q
)
+ , u(x1 + (1 − q)/q)
]
+ (1 − q)max [u(x1 − p − 1) + , u(x1 − 1)]
Result 2: Lottery tickets are not purchased outside the interval
[
x∗2 − 1−qq , x∗2 + 1
]
.
roof. See Appendix (Supplementary material).
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. If x1 > x∗2 + 1 the agent purchases the indivisible good regardless of the
utcome of the lottery. Thus only Vd=12 is relevant, and the concavity of V
d=1
2 (which is inherited from the concavity of u (·))nsures that the agent does not gamble. If x1 < x∗2 − (1 − q)/q the agent does not purchase the indivisible good regardless
f the outcome of the lottery. Thus only Vd=02 is relevant, and the concavity of V
d=0
2 (which is inherited from the concavity of
(·)) ensures that the agent does not gamble. The bounds, x∗2 − (1 − q)/q and x∗2 + 1 are illustrated in Fig. 2. In other words,
he maximum wealth range over which lottery purchases will occur is given by the size of the winnings.
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Corollary 1. A lottery winner always purchases the indivisible good.
Proof. Since lottery tickets are never bought if x1 < x∗2 − (1 − q)/q, a lottery winner (with net winnings (1 − q)/q) always
has x2 ≥ x∗2.
Corollary 2. A lottery player that does not win does not purchase the indivisible good.
Proof. Since lottery tickets are never bought if x1 ≥ x∗2 + 1, any unsuccessful lottery player (with net winnings −1) always
has x2 < x∗2.
Result 3: There exists a compact region, x1 ∈
[
x1, x1
]
, which contains x∗2
(
x1 < x∗2 < x1
)
, in which the agent will purchase
a lottery ticket.
Proof. See Appendix (Supplementary material).
From Result 2, we know that x∗2 − (1 − q)/q ≤ x1 < x1 ≤ x∗2 + 1. Within these bounds, the size of the region x1 ∈
[
x1, x1
]
depends on parameter values (, q and the curvature of u (·)).
Together, Corollaries 1 and 2, and Result 3 imply that the state space (of cash on hand) can be divided into three regions. A
region x1 ≤ x1 in which the agent does not buy a lottery ticket and does not buy the indivisible good; a region x1 < x1 ≤ x1
in which the agent buys a lottery ticket and then buys a durable if and only if she wins the lottery; and a region x1 > x1 in
which the agent does not buy the lottery ticket but does buy the indivisible good. This is shown in Fig. 2.
This simple model illustrates that lottery players are likely to be close to the margin of a discrete decision. The implications
of this theory for observable data are discussed in the next section.
3. Empirical implications
The model above assumes that a given person, at a given time, will react in the same way to an income windfall regardless
of its source. However, because lotteries are played by particular consumers, at particular times, the average response to a
lottery windfall may  be very different to the average response to other windfalls. This suggests, ﬁrst, that we  can test the
theory that consumers gamble to convexify by comparing responses to different kinds of windfalls. Second, research that
uses lotteries to estimate income effects will not estimate a population average income effect. This section develops these
implications and then we take them to data in the second half the paper.
We contrast the endogenously chosen lottery with a random windfall. To be concrete, we imagine that a random fraction
() of the population has an elderly, spinster aunt, who  with some probability, q, will die in the current period, leaving
a windfall. In this thought experiment we hold the fraction of individuals with an elderly aunt equal to the fraction of
consumers who chose to play the lottery. The key point of the thought experiment is that, while individuals chose to buy
a lottery ticket, they do not choose to have an aunt. We  think of the incidence and survival of aunts as random, so that the
income effect from inheritances then approximates the population average income effect.
In taking these implications to data, there are two sets of issues to consider. First, there is the structure of the data and
in particular whether or not we can identify potential recipients (lottery ticket purchasers, or consumers with an aunt) in
the data. The second set of issues revolves around whether observed inheritances might differ from a random windfall, and
how we might deal with this in our empirical strategy. We take up the data structure issue ﬁrst.
3.1. Different data structures
We  consider two cases, corresponding to two  different data structures. In the ﬁrst case, which resembles most of the
empirical studies using lottery windfalls, income effects are estimated by comparing recipients (lottery winners) and poten-
tial recipients (i.e. people who play the lottery, but lose). In the second case, which more closely resembles our data, the
comparison is between recipients and non-recipients. For lotteries, the latter includes both losers and non-players; for inher-
itances, the latter includes those without an aunt as well as those whose aunt survives. We  show that in both cases the extra
spending by lottery winners is a biased estimate of the population average income effect (the income effect arising from a
random windfall) because of the desire to convexiﬁy among some individuals, some of the time.
3.1.1. Comparing recipients and nonrecipients among potential recipients
First, consider the comparison between lottery winners and lottery losers. In the model developed above, an agent always
buys the indivisible good if they are a lottery winner (Corollary 1). Thus in this model, in which lottery playing is a choice,
the probability that a PC (d = 1|recipient) = 1 lottery winner purchases the indivisible good is one:
We use the superscript “c” to indicate that playing the lottery was  a choice taken by the individual. This, and subsequent
probabilities are summarized in Table 1.
In the case of the inheritance, the distribution of aunts is random and so the potential for receipt is random. This is
unlike the distribution of lottery tickets which results from a choice. However, among those with aunts, the actual receipt
of inheritance is random and this is like the randomness in winning the lottery. We  assume that the expected value of an
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Table  1
Probabilities of purchase: chosen lotteries versus random inheritances.
Windfall recipient
P(d = 1|recepient)
Potential recipient,
but no windfall
(losing ticket, surviving aunt)
P(d = 1|nonrecepient, potenial)
Non-recipient*
(losing ticket or no ticket, surviving aunt or no
aunt) P(d = 1|nonrecepient)
Chosen Lottery 1 0 1−F(x¯1)1−q
Random Inheritance 1 − F
(
x∗2 −
1 − q
q
)
1 − F(x∗2 + 1) 1 − Fa
Difference F
(
x∗2 −
1 − q
q
)
≥ 0 F
(
x∗2 + 1
)
− 1 < 0 q(1−F)1−q > 0a
Approx Bias: (Diff in diff) 1 + F(x∗2 −
1 − q
q
) − F(x∗2 + 1) > 0
F
(
x∗
2
− 1−qq
)
−q
(
1−
(
F
(
x∗
2
)
−F
(
x∗
2
− 1−qq
)))
1−q
a The probabilities of a non-recipient purchasing the durable good are approximations to the actual probabilities because the exact CDF’s are calculated
at  different points. Hence the probability of purchase by a non-recipient when the lottery is chosen is given by: (1 − F (x¯1))/ (1 − q) and the probability
o
(1−q)
(
1−F
(
x∗
2
+1
))
+(1−)
(
1−F
(
x∗
2
)) ( )
e
a
a
o
g
r
b
T
p
o
r
c
g
o
b
u
a
b
3
b
af  purchase by a non-recipient with a random inheritance is given by: 1−q . However, since x¯1 lies between x
∗
2 + 1 and x∗2,
valuating each CDF at the same value of x∗2 is a reasonable approximation.
unt is 09: when she is alive, there is a per-period cost of 1, analogous to the ticket price of the lottery; a probability q of
n inheritance being received, analogous to the probability of winning the lottery; and a windfall payout of an inheritance
f 1⁄q. Net of cost, recipients receive (1 − q)/q giving cash on hand of x2 = x1 + (1 − q)/q. They will purchase the indivisible
ood if x1 ≥ x∗2 − (1 − q)/q. We  use the superscript “R” to denote that the inheritance is a random windfall. Thus
PR (d = 1|recipient) = 1 − F
(
x∗2 −
1 − q
q
)
This implies recipients (that is, winners) from the chosen lottery are more likely to purchase the indivisible good than
ecipients of the random inheritance (column 1 of Table 1):
PC
(
d = 1
∣∣recipient) − PR(d = 1∣∣ recipient) = F (x∗2 − 1 − qq
)
≥ 0 (3)
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. In the case of the random inheritance, some recipients will come from
elow the lower threshold and will not have enough cash on hand to buy the divisible good even if they receive the windfall.
his difference tends to zero as q becomes increasingly small: if there is a windfall that is very large but with a very small
robability of receipt, it is in the interest of everyone with cash-on-hand below x∗2 to gamble to convexify, and all recipients
f a windfall will chose to buy the indivisible good.
For those that chose to play, but lost, the probability that they purchase the indivisible good is zero: PC (d = 1|non −
ecip, potential) = 0. By comparison, among the those with aunts, and whose aunt survives, there are some consumers with
ash on hand above the upper threshold
(
x∗2 + 1
)
.These consumers will have enough cash on hand to purchase the divisible
ood even though they do not receive an inheritance, i.e. PR(d = 1|non − recip, potential) = 1 − F
(
x∗2 + 1
)
. The probability
f purchase is therefore lower among losers of the chosen lottery (column 2 of Table 1):
PC (d = 1|non − recip, potential) − PR(d = 1|non − recip, potential) = F
(
x∗2 + 1
)
− 1 ≤ 0 (4)
Putting together the differences in purchase probabilities between recipients and the difference in purchase probabilities
etween potential recipients who do not receive, it is clear that the income effect in the case of the chosen lottery suffers from
pward bias compared to income effect from the random inheritance. The latter is an unbiased estimate of the population
verage income effect. An expression for the bias is given in the ﬁnal row of the second column of Table 1. The size of the
ias becomes smaller as the range in which tickets are bought becomes larger.
.1.2. Comparing recipients to all non-recipients
Non-recipients comprise, in the case of the lottery, both non-players and losers, and in the case of the random inheritance,
oth those without an aunt and those whose aunt survives. Starting with the chosen lottery, those who  choose not to play
re those with x1 < x1 or x1 > x1 while losers are the fraction 1 − q of lottery players, all of whom have x1 < x1 ≤ x1. Of
9 This is just an innocuous normalization to aid the comparison with the lottery.
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these non-recipients, only agents with cash on hand x1 > x1 buy the indivisible good. Recall that  is the fraction of lottery
players:  = F
(
x1
)
− F
(
x1
)
, where F (·) is  the cumulative distribution of cash on hand (x1) in the population. Thus
PC (d = 1|non − recip) =
1 − F
(
x1
)
1 − q (5)
The effect of winning the lottery (relative to non-recipients) on the probability of indivisible good purchase is therefore
the difference (row 1, columns 1 and 3 of Table 1):
PC (d = 1|recip) − PC (d = 1|non − recip) = 1 −
1 − F
(
x1
)
1 − q =
F
(
x1
)
− q
1 − q (6)
With random inheritance those with an aunt that survives are fraction (1 − q) of the population, and they purchase the
durable if x1 ≥ x∗2 + 1. Those without an aunt are the fraction (1 − ) of the population, and they purchase the durable if
x1 ≥ x∗2. The overall fraction of the population that are non-recipients is, as with the lottery, (1 − q) + (1 − ) = 1 − q.  Thus
the fraction of non-recipients who purchase the durable is:
PR (d = 1|non − recip) = P
R (d = 1, non − recip)
PR (non − recip)
=
(1 − q)
(
1 − F
(
x∗2 + 1
))
+ (1 − )
(
1 − F
(
x∗2
))
1 − q
(7)
This can be interpreted more easily if we approximate F(x∗2 + 1) by F(x∗2): this is a good approximation if the cost of an
aunt, 1, is small compared to cash-on-hand. The probability then becomes:
PR (d = 1|non − recip) ≈
(
1 − F
(
x∗2
))
(1 − q)
1 − q =
(
1 − F
(
x∗2
))
(8)
The denominator is the fraction of the population who  are not recipients. The ﬁrst part of the numerator, 1 − F
(
x∗2
)
, is
the fraction of all individuals whose cash-on-hand means they would purchase the durable regardless of receipt. Some of
these individuals will receive a random inheritance and so this fraction is multiplied by the fraction of the population that
are not recipients. Given the approximation that the cost of an aunt is small, the probability of purchase for non-recipients
of a random windfall is independent of the fraction of the population with an aunt.
By contrast, with a chosen lottery, none of those individuals who would purchase regardless of the lottery outcome
actually choose to buy lottery tickets. This means these “always purchasers” are all non-recipients, and the probability of
purchasing the durable among non-recipients is given by Eq. (5).
To aid interpretation of the difference between Eqs. (5) and (8), approximate F(x¯1) byF(x∗2) (recall from Results 2 and 3
that x∗2 < x¯1 ≤ x∗2 + 1). This gives a difference in the probability of purchase among non-recipients from the chosen lottery
and random inheritance of (column 3 of Table 1):
PC (d = 1|non − recip) − PR (d = 1|non − recip) ≈
q
(
1 − F
(
x∗2
))
1 − q ≥ 0 (9)
Note that  enters this difference only through PC and not through PR. It is only the fraction of individuals who choose
the lottery that matters and so we do not require the assumption that the fraction of aunts is equal to the fraction of lottery
players.
The probability of purchasing the durable among the non-recipients from the chosen lottery is higher. This arises from
a subtle composition effect because the group of non-recipents comprises two sets of individuals: those who did not have
a ticket and those that had a losing ticket. Some of those who were non-recipients by choice (i.e. chose not to have a ticket
because they would have purchased the durable anyway) do receive a windfall in he case of random inheritances. This then
reduces the number of purchasers of the durable among those who  were non-recipients. As q increases, this upward bias in
the purchase rate of non-recipients (relative to a random inheritance) gets smaller. By contrast, we showed above that the
upward bias in the purchase rate of winners (relative to a random inheritance) is increasing in q. This means that the net
bias in income effects gets larger as q increases.
The can be illustrated by calculating numerically the size of the bias among recipients and among non-recipients in
our simple model, at particular parameter values. We  assume a log-normal distribution for cash-on-hand, log utility for
consumption, and consider a high and low value for the utility of the durable(). Fig. 3 shows the difference in the probability
of purchase between the chosen lottery and random inheritance. For these parameters, estimates of the effect of a windfall
on the purchase of the durable from lotteries will overestimate the effect of a random windfall except for very small values
of q.
This discussion has highlighted the differing income effects that arise from different sorts of windfall gain. In particular,
the effect of a windfall on indivisible purchases is likely to be larger if the windfall arises from a lottery that the household has
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hosen to participate in because of gambling to convexify. However, the strength of this incentive will be diminished if capital
arkets are well functioning, and so agents can borrow or save, because this allows the path of non-durable consumption
o be unaffected by the timing of windfalls (Bailey and Olson Wonnacott, 1980; Hartley and Farrell, 2002). The need to
amble to convexify is also diminished if there are multiple indivisible goods of different sizes so that the indivisibility is less
lumpy”, or if there are uninsurable income shocks which provide some convexiﬁcation. This discussion highlights the large
umber of factors that affect the convexiﬁcation decision and that would need to be speciﬁed for a realistically calibrated
odel. Instead of following this approach, we look directly for evidence of convexiﬁcation in data on household choices. We
ow take up this empirical approach in greater detail, including how we deal with ways in which an inheritance may differ
rom random windfalls.
.2. Empirical framework
We  adopt a reduced form empirical approach directly motivated by our model. Our main empirical strategy is to estimate
 difference-in-differences (DiD) in income effects. In particular, we compare the effect of lottery winnings on purchases
f indivisible goods10 with the effect of inheritances – a different kind of windfall – and we  compare these differences in
ncome effects between households who are likely to be credit-constrained and those who  are not. The latter is because we
nly expect a demand for convexiﬁcation among the constrained. Unconstrained lottery players must be doing so for reasons
utside our model (entertainment, for example) and so we would not expect them to be grouped below the threshold of a
iscrete purchase.
We  estimate an empirical model along the following lines:
dit =
(
ˇ1 + ˇ2Cit
)
Lotit +
(
ˇ3 + ˇ4Cit
)
Inhit + ˛′Xit + uit (10)
here dit is a measure of durable purchases by household i at time t; Cit = 1 if the agent is constrained, and equals 0 otherwise;
otit and Inhit are ﬁnancial windfalls from lottery wins and inheritances, respectively; Xit is a vector of other variables that
ight affect purchase of durables, including age, composition of household (couple, number of kids), home-ownership
tatus, presence of constraints, employment status, ﬁnancial expectations and year dummies. The error term, uit , consists
f a household-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect and a random noise term, i.e. uit = i + εit.
In the context of the model above, inheritances are intended to approximate a random windfall. The assumption is not
hat inheritances are random across the population, but that they are exogenous with respect to the distance between cash
n hand (x1) and the critical value (x∗2), conditional on controls (including age) and individual ﬁxed effects. Note that the
ritical value will vary in the population and over time for a given individual according to tastes and needs.
Previous empirical literature has shown that durables respond to unexpected windfalls (see Keeler and Abdel-Ghany,
985), so we would expect ˇ1 = ˇ3 ≥ 0. The theoretical considerations developed in the previous section suggest that, among
onstrained households, selection into playing the lottery will lead to differential responses to a lottery win compared to
ther windfalls. Under the convexiﬁcation hypothesis, we expect durable purchases to respond more strongly to a lottery
in than to an inheritance among constrained households, i.e.
(
ˇ1 + ˇ2
)
>
(
ˇ3 + ˇ4
)
, and hence ˇ2 > ˇ4 > 0.
To claim that consumers are gambling to convexify, we  need to rule out alternative interpretations and we  deal with
his in a number of ways. First, we include household ﬁxed effects to remove level differences: the time-invariant unob-
10 The BHPS question actually asks about all gambling wins. In practice, 79% of all spending on gambling is on the UK National Lottery, according to the
xpenditure and Food Survey. This is a general household survey that is unlikely to capture serious gamblers, but it is similar to the BHPS sample. “Lottery
ins” is therefore a shorthand for all gambling wins.
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servable characteristics, such as risk or time preference that affect both lottery purchases and durable consumption. These
characteristics include any permanent propensity or preference for durables that differs between inheritors and winners.
The inclusion of household ﬁxed effects means that we are comparing changes in durable purchases, and not levels, across
subjects. Only a small fraction of our sample experienced both a lottery win  and an inheritance and so identiﬁcation is largely
across rather than within subjects.11
Second, our difference-in-differences strategy, comparing income effects across lottery wins and inheritances across
constrained and unconstrained households, controls for general differences in income effects that affect both constrained
and unconstrained households. As noted above, we would not expect unconstrained households to use a lottery as a means of
ﬁnancing indivisible purchases when they have savings or are able to borrow, because of the relatively high cost of gambling.
Differences between the two types of windfall may  include the possibility that inheritances are anticipated, as discussed
by Hurst and Lusardi (2004). As well as the DiD strategy, we present additional evidence showing that household ﬁnancial
expectations and consumption do not adjust in anticipation of an inheritance. This suggests that while individuals may  know
they have an elderly aunt, they do not know the timing and the amount of any inheritance.
An alternative explanation of different income effects is that the source of the money may  affect what people feel that they
can spend the money on. This idea was termed “emotional accounting” by Levav and McGraw (2009) and nicely summarized
by Epley and Gneezy (2007) in the following way: “although all dollars are created equal, one may  feel a pang of reluctance
at spending grandma’s inheritance on a new sports car, but little reluctance spending casino earnings doing the same.”
We implement an additional empirical test (which we call the “small winnings test”), the basis of which is the following:
among the people who received an inheritance there are likely to be some who were gambling to convexify, but who  lost the
(endogenously-chosen) gamble. We  would expect these people to behave like the typical person winning the gamble rather
than like the typical person receiving an inheritance. We exploit the fact that, while we do not observe people spending
money on gambling, we do observe people who win  small amounts (deﬁned as less than £100). These amounts are not
enough, typically, to ﬁnance consumer durables directly but they do allow us to identify people who have gambled. Thus
we test whether the income effect of inheritances is larger for credit-constrained individuals who we know were gambling
because we observe that they had small winnings. If this is the case, then it makes it clear that it is who receives the windfall
that matters, rather than the source of the money, and thus the explanation must be a selection story like the convexiﬁcation
hypothesis.
The convexiﬁcation hypothesis identiﬁes a potential selection mechanism that operates on variables (the need for
durables, cash on hand) that vary through time for a given individual as their economic circumstances change, and further
that operates only for the credit-constrained. By allowing for ﬁxed effects in estimating income effects, and by double-
differencing income effects (across the constrained and unconstrained, and across inheritors and lottery winners), we rule
out any alternative selection mechanism which operates on time-invariant unobservables, and any mechanism which is not
limited to the constrained. It is still possible (if improbable) that there is an alternative, time-varying selection mechanism
that operates only on gamblers who are constrained. We  cannot conclusively eliminate this possibility, but we  present addi-
tional strong evidence against there being such a selection mechanism in the form of a falsiﬁcation test involving non-durable
consumption.
4. Data
Our main analysis uses data taken from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) from 1997 to 2006 since this contains
information on both durable purchases and ﬁnancial windfalls. Beginning in 1991, this survey has annually interviewed
members of a representative sample of around 5500 households. On-going representativeness of the non-immigrant popu-
lation is maintained by using a “following rule” – i.e. by following original sample members (adult and children members of
households interviewed in the ﬁrst wave) if they move out of the household or if their original household breaks up.12 We
select single and two-adult households where the head is aged 20–70. Our analysis sample contains information on 6147
households (29,859 observations).
4.1. Consumer durables
We  focus on durables that are largely unchanged over the period and that are genuinely “lumpy” to purchase new.
This means we exclude, for example, VCRs which were becoming increasingly obsolete towards the end of the period, and
microwaves and CD players where the typical expenditure is fairly low. We  include televisions, fridge/freezers, washing
machines, tumble driers, dishwashers and home computers. On average, 36% households had purchased at least one of
these six durables over the previous year; 12% purchased two  or more. This is a set of basic durables that most households
seek to replace on a regular basis.
11 In the whole sample, 8% of households report receiving an inheritance and a lottery win, but we restrict our empirical work to a sample of inheritances
and  lottery wins within the range £100-£5000 where the fraction falls to 2%.
12 The survey incorporated booster samples from Scotland and Wales in 1999 and Northern Ireland in 2001, but we restrict our sample to original sample
members.
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In principle, households could potentially smooth their spending on new durables. One possibility is renting, although
his may  be easier for some durables (televisions, for example) than for others (fridge-freezers). Also, most rental companies
ave a minimum rental period of 12 or 18 months and require a credit check, so the option of renting may  not be open to
veryone. Similarly, hire purchase (rent-to-own) companies also require a credit check and may  charge high interest rates
f the repayments are made over a long period. We  think it is plausible that, compared to these alternatives, buying a lottery
icket may  not be an unattractive option.13
.2. Credit constraints
The BHPS does not have a question that asks directly about access to credit; we deﬁne constrained households as those
ith no (income from) savings or investments. This is a broad deﬁnition by which around half of all household-year obser-
ations are deﬁned as constrained.14 Note that, with this broad deﬁnition, our estimates are likely to under-estimate the
rue convexiﬁcation effect, compared to an approach where we could identify exactly which households face credit con-
traints. We  also show results additionally excluding anyone with household income in the top two-third of the distribution.
owever, recent evidence from Kaplan et al. (2014) indicates that even high income households with illiquid but not liquid
ssets may  face a hand-to-mouth existence.
.3. Lottery wins and inheritances
Since 1997, the BHPS has asked individuals whether they have received any of the following ﬁnancial windfalls in the
revious 12 months: a gambling win, an inheritance, a life insurance payment, a pension lump sum, a personal accident claim
r a redundancy payment. Our comparison focuses on gambling wins (referred to here as lottery wins since this is likely to
e the case for most) and inheritances since the other windfalls may  largely be anticipated (such as pension lump-sums),
s we show below, and/or may  be associated with events that directly affect the purchase of durables (such as redundancy
ayments).15
In the sample as a whole, 21 per cent of households reported at least one Lottery winning, while 5 per cent reported
n inheritance. However, the average amounts received in the two  cases are very different. The mean (median) Lottery
inning was £290 (£40) compared to £29,949 (£5000) in the case of inheritances. This is not surprising given the structure
f National Lottery payouts.16 However, this raises issues for our analysis; in particular, how to ensure that we  pick up the
esponse to a lottery win  compared to inheritance and not responses to different sized windfalls. Landsberger (1966) and
eeler and Abdel-Ghany (1985), for example, show that the size of the windfall affects what people do with it, with smaller
indfalls being more likely to be spent.
Our approach is to focus on “medium-sized” windfalls of between £100 and £5000. Anyone who receives a windfall of
ore than £5000 in any wave is dropped from the analysis and in our initial analysis we  ignore small (< £100) lottery wins
nd inheritances. In this range, 13% of households report ever receiving a lottery win, 8% report ever receiving an inheritance
nd 2% report receiving both. Focusing on medium wins seems appropriate given our interest in consumer durables: larger
ins may  be associated with more widespread lifestyle changes such as moving house, while smaller wins may  not be
nough to ﬁnance the purchase of the white goods we focus on. Furthermore, restricting windfalls to this narrower range
akes the average lottery win more comparable in size to the average inheritance. Within the range £100 − £5000, lottery
ins are still smaller on average than inheritances, as shown in Table 2, but the difference is much smaller. In sensitivity
nalysis (details available on request), we found similar results with narrower ranges of £100 − £1000 and £1001–£5000.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for constrained and unconstrained households. Many unconstrained households
eceive windfalls from lottery wins, and indeed a higher proportion than among those who are constrained. In fact, the
xistence of lottery winners who are not constrained is necessary for the DiD strategy described above. This is not inconsistent
ith people gambling to convexify, but is a reminder that this is only one of several possible motives for gambling. The BHPS
oes not contain information on who has gambled and lost. To provide direct evidence on who  gambles and how gambling
aries with total expenditure, we use data from the 2007 UK Expenditure and Food Survey. Fig. 4 shows that budget shares
n gambling decline markedly with total expenditure, consistent with the need to gamble to convexify being concentrated
13 There are rental outlets that speciﬁcally target those with poor credit histories which do not require a formal credit check, only ﬁve references. The
dvertised APR is 30%, but additional insurance which consumers are “strongly advised” to take out typically increases the effective rate of interest to more
han  100% (Collard and Kempson, 2005).
14 Young and Waldron (2006) show that 16% of the UK population is credit-constrained, according to self-reported constraints in the amount that they
ould  borrow, including both perceived constraints that discouraged them from applying for credit, and actual constraints where the household was
revented from borrowing either by the unavailability of credit or its high price. This is similar to Jappelli (1990) for the US who found that c. 20% of US
ouseholds are credit-constrained based on survey evidence that they have been refused credit, or put off applying for fear of refusal. This information is
ot  available in the BHPS.
15 We exclude any inheritances that are linked to widow(er)hood, i.e. deaths within the household that may  have an immediate effect on durable purchase.
16 The odds of winning £10 are 1:57, compared with odds of 1:1031 to win around £100, 1:55,490 to win  around £1000, 1:2,330,636 to win  around
100,000 and 1:13,983,817 to hit the jackpot.
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Table  2
Descriptive statistics.
Unconstrained Constrained
All Winners Non-winners Inheritors Non-inheritors All Winners Non-winners Inheritors Non-inheritors
Number of durables 0.516 0.544 0.514 0.640 0.512 0.493 0.714 0.486 0.574 0.492
Age  45.5 46.0 45.5 45.6 42.7 41.7 42.4 41.7 38.6 41.7
Income £2959 £3142 £2948 £3200 £2952 £2063 £2559 £2046 £2378 £2059
Degree  (0/1) 0.217 0.131 0.223 0.220 0.217 0.106 0.066 0.108 0.174 0.106
Kids  (0/1) 0.552 0.476 0.558 0.532 0.553 0.782 0.653 0.786 0.721 0.783
Couple  (0/1) 0.762 0.859 0.756 0.821 0.760 0.599 0.738 0.594 0.705 0.598
Mean  windfall £514 £1984 £595 £1875
Median windfall £224 £1500 £250 £1200
N  13,757 802 12,955 363 13,394 16,129 497 15,632 190 15,939
Notes: Number of durables refers to purchases made over the past 12 months of televisions, fridge/freezers, washing machines, tumbledriers, dishwashers
and  home computers). Age, degree are for head of household. Income is household net monthly income. Winners and inheritors refer to those who receive
lottery winnings and inheritances in the range £100–£5000. Constrained refers to no income from savings/dividends.Fig. 4. Household Gambling Expenditure, 2007 EFS. Budget Shares and% with Positive Expenditure.
among low income groups. Fig. 4 also shows that the fraction of households with positive gambling expenditure is around
40% across a wide range of incomes, again consistent with the idea of there being more than one motive for gambling.
Returning to Table 2, within the range we focus on (£100–£5000) there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference in average
windfall size between those who are potentially constrained and those who  are not. Also, there is no statistically signiﬁcant
difference in household income between those who receive a medium-sized lottery win  and those who receive a medium-
sized inheritance. This is reassuring for our difference-in-difference speciﬁcation. By contrast, the ﬁrst row of Table 2 shows
that there are clear differences across groups in the raw numbers of how many durables are being purchased. While the
average number of durables being purchased is about 0.5 for the unconstrained, this number rises to 0.7 for the constrained
who have had a windfall due to a lottery win (but not for the constrained inheritors). The aim of the detailed empirical
analysis below is to understand how much of this difference in the raw numbers is due to the economic circumstances of
those who have chosen to gamble.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Main results
Our main results, addressing the question “Do durable purchases respond differently to lottery wins than to inheri-
tances?”, are shown in Table 3. We  model the number of durables purchased during the previous twelve months as the
dependent variable. Below we show that the results are very similar when the dependent variable is a binary indicator for
whether or not the household purchased any durables. We  include lottery wins and inheritances in amounts (in £’00s).
Below, we show results for a binary indicator for whether or not the household inherited/received lottery winnings.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 are estimated using OLS. The results in column (1) indicate a stronger propensity to
consume durables out of lottery winnings than out of an inheritance. In Column (2) we interact the windfall variables with
a dummy  variable indicating whether the household is constrained. This corresponds to Eq. (11) above and implements
our main DiD test. The results in column (2) show that the stronger response to lottery winnings than to inheritances is
driven just by those who are constrained, in line with our model. Columns (3) and (4) include household ﬁxed effects to
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Table  3
Main regression results. Dependent variable = Number of durables purchased in the last 12 months.
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) FE (4) FE
1 Lot(£’00) 0.012** 0.004 0.010** 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
2 Lot(£’00)*C 0.017** 0.016**
(0.007) (0.007)
3 Inh(£’00) 0.003** 0.003* 0.004** 0.004*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
4 Inh(£’00)*C 0.000 −0.000
(0.003) (0.004)
N  29,859 29,859 29,859 29,859
R2 0.046 0.046 0.008 0.009
1 = 3 [p-value] [0.012] [0.632] [0.135] [0.814]
(1 + 2) = (3 + 4) [0.007] [0.036]
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dotes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the household level (6147 households). ** denotes statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level; * at the
0%  level. Lot and Inh refer to lottery winnings and inheritances in the range £100–£5000. C = constrained = no income from savings/dividends. Other
ontrols: Age of head of household and age squared; couple; indicators for number of children; home-owner; head of household is unemployed, retired,
ther  non-work; ﬁnancial expectations for next year, constrained; year dummies.
ontrol for time-invariant unobservable characteristics, including time- and risk preferences that may  affect both durable
urchases and lottery participation. Column (4) presents the DiD test including household ﬁxed effects. This allows for ﬁxed
ffects in estimating income effects and double-differences income effects (across the constrained and unconstrained, and
cross inheritors and lottery winners), ruling out any alternative selection mechanism which operates on time-invariant
nobservables and is not limited to the constrained. Column (4) is our preferred speciﬁcation.
We ﬁnd no evidence for any general “lottery winnings effect” – there is no signiﬁcant difference in the response to lottery
nd inheritances among unconstrained households. However, among the constrained, the marginal propensity to consume
urables out of (endogenously-selected) lottery winnings is nearly ﬁve times stronger than that out of an (exogenously
etermined) inheritance. To give some indication of how big these responses are, consider a typical medium-sized lottery
in or inheritance of £500. This would result in a 0.095 increase in the number of durables purchased within the year among
onstrained households, which is an increase of 19% over the baseline purchase rate of those who are neither winners nor
nheritors (0.49 from Table 2). The corresponding numbers for a £500 inheritance are a 0.020 increase in the number, which
s a 4% increase over the baseline purchase rate. While this focuses on the constrained, they comprise nearly half of our
ample. These numbers suggest that using lottery wins as an instrument is likely to do a poor job in estimating population
verage income effects.
.2. Alternative speciﬁcations
Table 4 summarizes the results from a number of alternative speciﬁcations. To facilitate comparison, we include the
esults from our preferred speciﬁcation (Table 3, column 4) in the ﬁrst column of Table 4.
First, we impose common support on our sample. A possible limitation of regression adjustment is that, except in the
pecial case of discrete independent variables and a fully-saturated model, it allows estimation of counterfactuals for treated
nits for whom there are no similar control units. To address this, we  estimate propensity score models for the treatment
roup (constrained, lottery winners) versus each control group and impose common support in the probability, given charac-
eristics, of being a constrained lottery winner (a propensity score). Given the similarity in characteristics among the groups
Table 2), imposing common support results in dropping relatively few observations and the estimates, shown in Column
2) of Table 4 are very similar.
Column (3) of Table 4 conﬁrms that the results are also similar if we  adopt a binary dependent variable and estimate the
robability of durable purchase rather than the number of durables purchased.
There may  be a concern that the relationship may  be mis-speciﬁed since our windfall variables include a large number of
eroes. If we include lottery wins and inheritances as binary indicators (and include household ﬁxed effects), we  ﬁnd similar
stimated responses to lottery winnings and inheritances among constrained households (Column (5)). However, one issue
ith this speciﬁcation is that the typical lottery win  is much smaller than the typical inheritance making the effects hard to
ompare directly. Column (6) presents a further speciﬁcation that includes both a binary indicator and the amount of the
indfall and p-values for the test that lotteries and inheritances have the same effect on durables purchased using the mean
f the two types of windfalls (£550 and £2000 respectively). The ﬁnding is the same − we ﬁnd a stronger effect of lottery
innings than inheritances on durable purchases, but only among the constrained.
Finally, column (7) includes a tighter deﬁnition of constrained, including only those in the bottom third of the incomeistribution. The broader measure may  well understate the importance of the bias induced by self-selection into lottery
laying if the broader measure is treating some unconstrained individuals as constrained. Comparing column (7) with
olumn (1), the difference between constrained lottery players and constrained inheritors is greater with the narrower
eﬁnition of a constraint.
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Table 4
Alternative speciﬁcations.
(1) FE
Main
Results
(2) FE
common
support
(3) FE
Discrete
dependent
variable
(4) OLS
Discrete
windfall
variable (5) FE
Discrete
windfall
variable
(6) FE
Discrete +
continuous
windfall
(7) FE
Tighter
deﬁnition of
constrained
1 Lot(£’00) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
2 Lot(£’00)*C 0.016** 0.016** 0.005* 0.014 0.012
(0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008)
3 Inh(£’00) 0.004* 0.004* 0.004** 0.001 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
4 Inh(£’00)*C −0.000 −0.002 −0.002 0.009 −0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
5 Lot(0/1) 0.031 0.008 −0.008
(0.029) (0.040) (0.047)
6 Lot(0/1)*C 0.183** 0.119* 0.032
(0.055) (0.066) (0.081)
7 Inh(0/1) 0.090** 0.118** 0.094
(0.044) (0.055) (0.087)
8 Inh(0/1)*C −0.062 −0.108 −0.273*
(0.076) (0.103) (0.159)
N  29,859 29,281 29859 29,859 29,859 29,859 29859
R2 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.046 0.008 0.009 0.009
1 = 3 [p-value] [0.814] [0.770] [0.761] [0.607]
5 = 7 [0.258] [0.106]
(1 + 2) = (3 + 4) [0.036] [0.024] [0.035] [0.014]
(5 + 6) = (7 + 8) [0.014] [0.242]
(5 + x¯1) = (7 + x¯3), x¯ = £550 [0.293]
(5 + x¯1) = (7 + x¯3), x¯ = £2000 [0.553]
((5 + x¯1) +(6 + x¯2)) = ((7 + x¯3)+(8 + x¯4), x¯ = £550 [0.047]
((5 + x¯1) +(6 + x¯2)) = ((7 + x¯3)+(8 + x¯4), x¯ = £2000 [0.018]
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the household level. ** denotes statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level; * at the 10% level. Lot and Inh refer to lottery winnings and inheritances in the range
£100–£5000. C = constrained = no income from savings/dividends, except speciﬁcation (7) where C = constrained = no income from savings/dividends and in the bottom third of the income distribution. Other
controls: Age of head of household and age squared; couple; indicators for number of children; home-owner; head of household is unemployed, retired, other non-work; ﬁnancial expectations for next year,
constrained; year dummies.). In speciﬁcation (3) the dependent variable is a discrete (0/1) measure of whether a durable was purchased during the previous 12 months. The tests for speciﬁcation (6) are evaluated
at  the mean of both lottery winnings (£550) and inheritances (£2000).
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Table  5
Are windfalls expected?
Fixed effects regression results.
Dependent variable: (0/1) whether household head expects ﬁnancial situation to improve over the next 12 months
Whole sample Constrained Unconstrained
Lot (0/1) t+1 0.008 (0.016) −0.009(0.028) 0.012 (0.020)
Inh  (0/1) t+1 0.018 (0.028) 0.034 (0.049) −0.019(0.037)
Other (0/1) t+1 0.035**(0.014) 0.014 (0.022) 0.058**(0.019)
N  27,410 14,508 12,884
R2 0.001 0.000 0.001
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the household level. ** denotes statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level; * at the 10% level. Lot and Inh
refer  to lottery winnings and inheritances in the range £100–£5000. “Other” refers to other windfalls and includes life insurance policy payments, pension
lump-sums, redundancy payments, personal accident claims and “anything else”. Constrained = no income from savings/dividends.
Table 6
Small winnings test.
Main results Further test
1 Lot(£’00) 0.003 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003)
2 Lot(£’00)*C 0.016**(0.007) 0.016**(0.006)
3 Inh(£’00) 0.004* (0.002) 0.004* (0.002)
4 Inh(£’00)*C −0.000(0.004) −0.004(0.004)
1 SmLot(0/1)*Inh(£’00) −0.000(0.005)
2 SmLot(0/1)*Inh(£’00)*C 0.019 (0.013)
1 = 3 [p-value] [0.814] [0.780]
(1 + 2) = (3 + 4) [0.036] [0.008]
(1 + 2) = ((3 + 4) + (1 + 2)) [.898]
N  29,859 29,859
R2 0.009 0.009
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potes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the household level (6147 households). ** denotes statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level; * at the
0%  level. Lot and Inh refer to lottery winnings and inheritances in the range £100–£5000. C = constrained = no income from savings/dividends; SmLot is
n  indicator if the household receives a lottery win of less than £100. Regressions include full set of controls as in Table 3.
.3. Are inheritances anticipated?
As noted in section 3, one potential concern is that inheritances may  differ from lottery wins in being reasonably well
nticipated by the individual. Table 5 reports the results of a ﬁxed effects regression of a binary indicator for whether the
head of the) household expects their ﬁnancial situation to improve over the next 12 months on a set of indicators for whether
r not the household does in fact receive a lottery win, an inheritance or one of the other ﬁnancial windfalls (life insurance
ayment, pension lump sum, personal accident claim, redundancy payment) over the following 12 months, focusing on
edium-sized windfalls (between £100–£5000). Only the coefﬁcient on other windfalls is positive and signiﬁcant; our
nancial expectation data do not contain any evidence that medium inheritances are anticipated. Consistent with this,
ensitivity analysis (details available on request) that included lead terms in the durables regression to pick up the effect of
ny anticipated windfalls found no signiﬁcant anticipation effects.
.4. The small winnings test
We  also perform what we call the “small winnings” test, by estimating the following empirical model:
dit =
(
ˇ1 + ˇ2Cit
)
Lotit +
(
ˇ3 + ˇ4Cit
)
Inhit +
(
ı1 + ı2Cit
)
SmLotit × Inhit + ˛’Xit + uit (11)
here SmLotit = 1 if someone receives a lottery win of less than £100, and equals 0 otherwise. Our hypothesis is that, among
onstrained households, those who receive a medium-sized inheritance and also a small lottery win  will not behave like
hose who only received a medium-sized inheritance but rather will have the larger income responses of those who receive
 medium-sized lottery win (i.e. (1 + 2) = (3 + 4) + (1 + 2))
The results in Table 6 show that this is exactly what we ﬁnd in our data. Column (1) reproduces (from Column (4) of
able 3) the results from our main DiD speciﬁcation with household ﬁxed effects. In Column (2) we  report estimates of Eq.
11) in which we interact the inheritance variables with a dummy  indicating a small lottery win. We  ﬁnd that constrained
nheritors that we know to have been gambling exhibit much larger income effects than other inheritors. In fact, their
esponses are not statistically different from the responses of lottery winners. This test provides further conﬁrmation that
ur ﬁndings in the previous section were not driven by differences in the way individuals respond to lottery winnings
ompared to inheritances. Instead, it is the characteristics and situation of the person who  receives the money that matters.
onstrained gamblers have larger responses and this is consistent with the idea that they are a selected group: close to a
urchase margin.
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Table  7
Falsiﬁcation tests.
Number of durables Food at home (£) Meals out (£)
1 Lot(£’00) 0.003 (0.004) −0.045 (0.102) 0.846**(0.307)
2 Lot(£’00)*C 0.016** (0.0052) 0.195 (0.167) 0.349 (0.457)
3 Inh(£’00) 0.004* (0.002) 0.047 (0.061) 0.169 (0.1136)
4 Inh(£’00)*C −0.000 (0.004) −0.009 (0.083) 0.381* (0.217)
1 = 3 [p-value] [0.814] [0.440] [0.045]
(1 + 2) = (3 + 4) [0.036] [0.453] [0.082]
N  29,859 28,859 29,859
R2 0.009 0.109 0.072Notes: Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the household level (6147 households). ** denotes statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level; * at the 10% level.
Lot  and Inh refer to lottery winnings and inheritances in the range £100–£5000. C = constrained = no income from savings/dividends. Other controls as in
Table 3.
5.5. Falsiﬁcation tests
Finally, in Table 7 we present the results from running our main speciﬁcation but with measures of non-durable spending.
The BHPS contains only a small number of these measures – we include weekly household spending on food for home
consumption or, separately, food out (in restaurants) on the left-hand side.17 Since these are both divisible goods, these
results provide a falsiﬁcation test of the convexiﬁcation hypothesis.
We ﬁnd zero income effects for both lottery wins and inheritance receipts when we  examine spending on food for
home consumption. For meals out, we ﬁnd a difference in the propensity to spend out of lottery winnings and inheritances.
People are more likely to spend money on a meal out when they win on the lottery than when they inherit, consistent
with an emotional accounting story. Crucially, however, this difference is common to both constrained and unconstrained
households – both types react to a moderate win on the lottery by celebrating with a meal out. On this evidence, our ﬁnding
of a differential response to lottery wins and inheritances for the constrained and not for the unconstrained is true only for
durable purchases, consistent with our model of gambling to convexify.
6. Conclusion
Following an idea ﬁrst proposed by Ng (1965) this paper shows that consumers are more likely to gamble when faced
with a discrete decision and we illustrated how using windfalls from endogenously chosen lotteries could give rise to biased
estimates of population income effects. The key point is that the group of lottery players is determined by a time-varying
selection mechanism that is directly related to the outcome of interest.
We  have presented convincing empirical support for the hypothesis that consumers sometimes gamble to convexify their
choice sets. The purchase of durables responds more strongly to a lottery win than to another windfall among constrained
households. Our empirical strategy – difference-in-differences with household ﬁxed effects − rules out any alternative
explanation for this ﬁnding that involves time-invariant unobservable characteristics of lottery players and/or that applies
to all lottery players (constrained and un-constrained). It is hard to think of another selection mechanism that can explain
this result. Our small winnings test and falsiﬁcation test using items of non-durable spending provide further support for
our preferred explanation.
Our ﬁndings are important for a number of reasons. They provide at least a part of the explanation for gambling among
low-income households, and also for the popularity of prize-linked savings products amongst these households. Our ﬁnding
complements the recent discussion by Mullainathan and Shaﬁr (2009) that lotteries may  play a role in the household ﬁnances
of low-income households. Given the poor return to playing lotteries, our evidence that individuals are gambling to ﬁnance
indivisible purchases highlights the lack of ﬁnancing options available to poor households, and the severity of the ﬁnancial
constraints they face.
Our ﬁndings demonstrate that assuming that individuals facing non-convex choice sets play wealth lotteries – as is often
done in structural models with discrete choices – is not just a technical convenience. This modeling strategy captures an
important aspect of how real individuals behave when faced with such non-convexities.
Our ﬁndings also highlight issues with using lottery winnings to instrument for income. The random success of winning
a gamble would seem to make it a natural instrument for unanticipated income changes and has motivated the widespread
use of lotteries in identifying income effects. However giving consideration to theoretical reasons for why people gamble is
crucial for understanding exactly what is being estimated in this case. Our ﬁndings indicate that the degree of over-estimation
is likely to be sizeable. Among constrained households, using lottery winnings leads to estimated income effects that are
ﬁve times bigger than using other windfall income. Since the deﬁnition of constrained consists of half of all households in
our sample, this suggests that using lottery wins as an instrument is likely to do a poor job in estimating population average
income effects.
17 In the BHPS, the food data are banded and we take the mid-points.
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We  have deﬁned constrained as those with no income from savings or investment. It is important to note that this might
e a marker for perceived illiquidity rather than actual illiquidity: individuals with limited ﬁnancial literacy may  believe
hemselves to be constrained and so resort to inefﬁcient ﬁnancial instruments like lotteries. The policy implications of actual
ersus perceived illiquidity may  differ: the former is an argument for making more instruments available, while the latter
s about public awareness of existing instruments.
Playing lotteries may  be part of a larger set of strategies where risks are taken to overcome thresholds. The presence of
ayday lenders, pawn shops and evidence of weak ﬁnancial institutions are often found in areas of high crime and highly
ariable outcomes.
More generally, gambling data has been used to identify consumer preferences, beliefs on probabilities and wealth
lasticities. A key example in the literature is the attempt to identify whether the under-purchase of short-odd gambles is
ue to risk loving preferences or due to probability misperception.18 Our analysis suggests that gambling is induced by a
ational response to features of some individuals’ consumption opportunity sets. Analyses that ignore these features of the
onsumption opportunity set (such as non-convexities) will mischaracterize preferences for risk and evidence of probability
isperception. In some circumstances, gambling by fully-informed, risk-averse individuals is rational behavior borne out of
ecessity.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.07.023.
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